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Abstract
This paper explores the long-run relationship between institutions and wage
outcomes in Europe and its periphery. I ﬁnd that cities that exercised stronger
institutional protection of private property experienced: (i) higher levels of both
skilled and unskilled real wages, as well as (ii) lower levels of inequality as measured
by the skilled-unskilled wage ratio. While the ﬁrst result corroborates existing work
on the positive growth eﬀects of better institutions, the second ﬁnding is more novel
to the literature. Some explanations are proposed for how stronger institutions
can cause an increase in the relative supply of skilled workers, thus lowering wage
inequality.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In recent years, the research agenda on the sources of economic growth has seen a re-
newed focus on the role of institutions. Following North (1981) and North and Weingast
(1989), much of this literature has dwelt on one particular form of institutions, namely
the provision of a secure system of property rights protection. According to this view,
a strong set of institutions is needed to prevent the executive or other elite groups from
laying claim to private wealth, in order to foster an environment conducive to the accu-
mulation of capital, and hence growth. A slew of empirical studies have lent weight to
this hypothesis. Knack and Keefer (1995) and Barro (1997) among others identiﬁed a
positive cross-country correlation between aggregate growth and measures of institutions
such as the rule of law. More recently, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) used
settler mortality rates as an instrumental variable for the risk of capital expropriation, in
order to isolate the causal eﬀect of institutions on income levels.
Within the context of Europe, institutions have received much attention as a leading
explanation for why some states grew faster than others over the long run.1 Characterizing
absolutist rulers as those who “saw the legal system as an instrument of control rather
than a constraint on their actions” (p. 673), DeLong and Shleifer (1993) showed that
European states run by such “princes” experienced slower growth in city populations than
those governed as free republics. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002) pursued this
research program further by constructing indices on the strength of capitalist institutions
stretching back to 1000A.D. Using these measures, the authors argued that access to
Atlantic trade was crucial for growth, and that it was precisely those cities in Atlantic
states with strong institutions where commerce expanded in full force. Notably, England
(after the “Glorious Revolution” of 1688A.D.) and the Netherlands (after shaking oﬀ
Spanish rule) established political systems where legislative power resided in a parliament,
eﬀectively checking any arbitrary powers of the sovereign, and thereby facilitating the rise
of an urban merchant class.
This paper contributes to the growing empirical literature on institutions, by exam-
1The large variance in the timing and pace of growth across Europe is well-documented. DeLong and
Shleifer (1993) identiﬁed a northward shift in the growth of cities away from the Mediterranean Basin
between 1000-1500A.D. Separately, Van Zanden (1999) and Allen (2001) observed that a divergence in
wage levels had set in between Western and Eastern Europe by the mid-1700s, before the onset of the
Industrial Revolution.
2ining how they aﬀected wage outcomes in a broad sample of 17 cities in Europe and its
periphery (including Istanbul). The use of wage data confers two distinct advantages over
existing studies. First, real wages are a more direct measure of the welfare of workers
than aggregate incomes, since wages in principle capture the actual returns earned by la-
bor.2 T h i sp a p e rt h u st e s t sf o rt h ee ﬀects of institutions on income levels directly, without
having to use a proxy for the dependent variable such as urbanization or city population,
as has been the practice to date. Second, the data from Allen (2001) and ¨ Ozmucur and
Pamuk (2002) includes wages for both skilled craftsmen and unskilled laborers, therefore
allowing us to investigate the relationship between institutions and wage inequality. His-
torians have documented how the urbanization of Europe was accompanied by a widening
rich-poor divide, which on occasion boiled over into outbreaks of violence such as food
riots (Hohenberg and Lees 1985, p. 131). Inequality was thus a very real problem, and
it is relevant to ask how improvements in institutions might have aﬀected the relative
economic position of diﬀerent groups of workers.3
Using the institutional indices coded by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002), I
show in Section 2 that cities with more stringent protection of private property saw higher
subsequent real wages for both skilled craftsmen and unskilled laborers. This ﬁnding is
consistent with the broader literature reviewed above on the positive growth eﬀects of
better property rights protection. More interestingly, I also ﬁnd that stronger initial
institutions were associated with lower levels of urban wage inequality, as measured by
the skilled-unskilled wage ratio.
Importantly, these ﬁndings are robust to the inclusion of several key variables that
have been proposed as competing hypotheses to the importance of institutions. First,
Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2002) and Lal (1998) have argued that factor endowments were
a more fundamental determinant of growth, as the initial cards dealt by nature often
shaped the types of political and economic institutions set up to adapt to these external
conditions. Nevertheless, I ﬁnd that the institutional variables were signiﬁcant even when
controlling for variables related to the supply of land and labor, which suggests that
2This argument in favor of factor returns data over macro aggregates as a measure of welfare is
well-articulated in the economic history literature. See, for example, Williamson (1995).
3In a modern context, De Soto (2000) has proposed that the establishment of legal institutions to
recognize the ownership of property occupied by the poor could help to improve their economic condition
signiﬁcantly, as this would allow them to use their property as collateral to gain access to credit.
3institutions were not completely endogenous to factor endowments in the case of Europe
and its periphery. Similarly, the eﬀect of institutions was unchanged when a dummy for
Atlantic trader states was included, which would appear to mitigate the overriding role
assigned to Atlantic commerce as a pre-condition for growth emphasized by Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson (2002). Finally, Glaeser et. al. (2004) have argued for the primacy
of human capital over institutions as a source of long-run growth by examining post-
World War II panel data. For the historical sample in this paper though, the use of adult
literacy rates as a proxy for human capital did not overturn the signiﬁcance of institutions
as a determinant of real wage levels (although the results are slightly less robust for the
regressions involving wage inequality).
The key ﬁnding that stronger initial institutions were linked to lower skill premiums
clearly warrants more discussion, as there is little theoretical work (to the best of my
knowledge) that posits a causal link from institutions to inequality. Section 3 oﬀers
some candidate explanations that describe how an improvement in the security of private
property can increase the incentives for skill accumulation. This would raise the supply of
skilled workers in urban centers, and subsequently reduce the wage gap between craftsmen
and unskilled workers. Section 4 of the paper presents some concluding remarks.
2 Empirical evidence from Europe and its periphery
The empirical work in this paper is based on a data set of 17 cities in Europe and its
periphery, put together from several independent sources. This sample contains a good
geographic spread, including cities at the heart of the Atlantic economy, such as London
and Amsterdam, as well as several cities in Eastern Europe and the periphery, such as
Gdansk, Warsaw and Istanbul.4
The data on wages are from Allen (2001) for European cities and from ¨ Ozmucur and
Pamuk (2002) for Istanbul.5 The wages (in grams of silver per day) of building craftsmen
and construction laborers are used as measures of skilled and unskilled wages respectively.
To obtain real wages, the silver wages are deﬂated by price indices constructed by the
4A full list of cities and the countries that they were mapped to can be found in the Data Appendix
under the item labelled “Total Population”.
5¨ Ozmucur and Pamuk (2002) gathered and constructed their data in a manner similar to Allen (2001),
which facilitates direct comparisons between the two sources.
4respective authors, based on consumption baskets comprising mainly foodstuﬀs, cloth and
fuel items. I use 50-year averages of this data (for 1500-1549, 1550-1599, ...1850-1899),
in order to net out short-term ﬂuctuations. This provides up to 8 data points for each
city, although the panel is slightly unbalanced due to a small number of missing entries.
The empirical work focuses on the role of institutions as a key determinant of these
wage outcomes. Property rights institutions, or the lack thereof, clearly left an imprint
on the economic well-being of the residents of pre-modern Europe. Its rulers were con-
stantly in need of resources to ﬁnance wars or sovereign expenditures, and obtained these
funds either by coercion or by turning to capitalist interests such as urban federations or
bankers (Tilly 1990). Blockmans (1994) writes that: “Initially, population growth and the
commercialization of the economy simply produced more collective wealth, of which the
kings and other princes took their share in the form of rising and new income from tolls,
mintage, justice, and the granting of privileges. As a further step, the princes discovered
they could raise more money through new forms of taxation and by loans from foreign
merchants” (p. 225). There was clearly a lot of variation across Europe in the extent
to which private property or capital could be regarded at secure. At one extreme were
the absolutist regimes, described by DeLong and Shleifer (1993) as states in which all
property “was always potentially insecure” (p. 679), citing France under Louis XIV in the
17th century and Spain under Philip II in the 16th century as two of the most egregious
examples.6 On the other hand, Europe also witnessed the emergence of state systems in
which the powers of the ruler were circumscribed: Great Britain became a constitutional
monarchy after 1688, while merchant interests came to dominate the aﬀairs of state in
the Dutch Republic.
As measures of the strength of institutions, I use the indices recently coded by Ace-
moglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002). These indices take values on an integer scale from
1 to 7 (higher numbers denoting stronger institutions), which helps to capture the large
variance in property rights regimes observed in practice. Two such measures are available:
The “constraint” index measures the extent to which codiﬁed laws or regulations formally
curbed the ability of the state executive to extract private wealth. On the other hand, the
6On the latter example, Albeladejo (1994) provides a comprehensive account of how the Habsburgs
sent the Castilian cities into a systematic decline with their penchant for raising ﬁnances through tax
increases and unsustainable debt issues.
5“protection” index captures the degree to which property rights protection was formally
extended to urban merchants, particularly in the event of a dispute with the monarch or
other nobles. The scoring of these indices followed stringent guidelines: The “constraint”
variable was coded using the same criteria as the Marshall and Jaggers (2000) Polity IV
“constraint on the executive” index, while the “protection” variable adapted this frame-
work to the context of ruler-merchant relations. (For more details on the precise coding
criteria used, please see the Data Appendix.)
I treat these indices as measures of initial institutions, and use them as explanatory
variables for the average wages observed over each subsequent 50-year period. In theory,
one would expect a lack of secure protection for merchant capital to mute the level of
economic activity and commerce, hence depressing the wages of workers employed in these
urban centers.
2.1 Econometric speciﬁcation
To explore the relationships between institutions and wage outcomes, I run regressions of
the following form:
logwjt = α × INSTit + β
0 × Xijt + Dj + Dj × t + Dt +  ijt (1)
where the dependent variable, wjt, is either the level of real wages or the skilled-unskilled
wage ratio. Here, i indexes states/countries, j indexes cities, and t denotes time (1500,
1550, ..., 1850). The key coeﬃcient of interest is α, which captures the eﬀect of institu-
tions (coded at the country-level) on wage outcomes in individual cities.
The vector Xijt controls for other potential determinants of wages. This includes ﬁrst
a measure of the city population from Bairoch, Batou and Ch` evre (1988) for European
cities and Chandler (1987) for Istanbul. Such variables relating to city size have been
used in the economic history literature to proxy for the overall level of prosperity and
growth in an urban center, and hence should be positively correlated to the level of real
wages. Next, the supply of labor would have mattered too for wages. I thus control for
the ratio of the city population over the total country population, where the variable
in the denominator is drawn from McEvedy and Jones (1978). I view this ratio as an
estimate for the concentration of labor in the city relative to its surrounding rural areas.
Higher values would thus imply more downward pressure on the level of urban wages.
6Last but not least, I include an estimate of the land-labor ratio, namely the agricultural
land area divided by the total country population. States endowed with relatively more
arable land would in principle have been able to generate more agricultural output per
head to raise the populace above a subsistence level. A higher land-labor ratio would thus
imply potentially higher levels of worker productivity and hence have a positive impact
on real wages. Such domestic constraints on the land would have been especially binding
pre-1850 when the volume of cross-border trade in grain was limited, both because of the
high cost of transportation and trade barriers such as Britain’s Corn Laws. Estimates of
the agricultural land area are taken from the Food and Agricultural Organization’s (FAO)
Production Yearbook; given the lack of historical data on land utilization, this measure is
a constant value over time, reﬂecting the total potential area that could be exploited for
agricultural purposes in each country.7 (A more detailed description of the data sources
is provided in the Data Appendix.)
The estimated equation in (1) includes city and year ﬁxed eﬀects, Dj and Dt respec-
tively, as well as a city-speciﬁcl i n e a rt i m et r e n d ,Dj × t (city dummies interacted with
the year of observation), to mitigate any potential omitted variables bias. In particular,
it is possible that the observed correlation between institutions and wages may in fact be
independently driven by an unobserved third variable that itself exhibits time persistence,
such as successive technological improvements or an underlying industrialization process.
The use of city-speciﬁc time trends thus helps to control for such omitted variables.8 To
further address possible simultaneity issues, all the explanatory variables used are mea-
sures of initial conditions at the beginning of each 50-year period, so that the results
reﬂect how a given conﬁguration of institutions and factor supplies impacted subsequent
wage outcomes.
7The regression results are very similar when using the data on total land area from the same FAO
source in place of the agricultural land variable. The results were similarly robust to replacing the total
country population throughout by estimates of the size of the rural population. For more information on
how this latter variable was constructed, please see the Data Appendix.
8The structure of this time trend is kept to a simple linear process, since the inclusion of a quadratic
term would increase the number of parameters to a minimum of 17 × 3 = 51 (for the city dummies and
their interactions with year and year squared). This would have been an unreasonably large number of
parameters to estimate with only a total of 118 data points.
72.2 Institutions and real wages
Applying this econometric framework, I ﬁnd strong evidence that cities with better initial
institutions did indeed witness higher real wages for both skilled and unskilled labor.
Looking ﬁrst at the results for skilled wages, a basic regression of the log real wage for
craftsmen provides hints of a positive correlation with the institutional variables:
logReal skilled wages =

   






   
   
+ Dj + Dj × t + Dt +  ijt
The standard errors reported are clustered within each country-year cell, to allow for
correlated shocks in the  ijt term for cities in the same country (such as Florence, Milan
a n dN a p l e si nI t a l y )i na n yg i v e ny e a r . 9 Although the coeﬃcients estimated above are not
statistically signiﬁcant, the addition of the vector of controls, Xijt, delivers much more
compelling results.
Table 1 shows that property rights institutions had a positive and signiﬁcant impact
on real skilled wages, after suitably controlling for various variables related to the supply
of land and labor. Speciﬁcally, Column 1 includes the city population, the ratio of city to
total population, and the ratio of agricultural land to total population; the regressions are
now also run with weights proportional to the city population. Both the “constraint” and
“protection” indices are signiﬁcant in their respective regressions at the 5% level. The
results are very similar when using either institutional variable, which is not surprising
given the high correlation between these two indices (correlation coeﬃcient: 0.88).10
Moreover, the coeﬃcients of the three control variables all show up with the predicted
sign. Real skilled wages are positively (and signiﬁcantly) correlated with city population
levels, so cities at a more advanced stage of urban development did sustain higher incomes.
On the other hand, the ratio of the city to total population has a negative (though not
statistically signiﬁcant) eﬀect, suggesting that a higher relative supply of urban labor
tends to lower wages in the city. Finally, the coeﬃcient for the land-labor ratio is positive
9I also report results later in the paper that cluster the standard errors by country only, to alleviate
concerns about how serial correlation in both the wage and institutions variables might lead to a downward
bias in the standard errors.
10In contrast, Allen (2003) does not ﬁnd institutions to be a signiﬁcant determinant of his Allen (2001)
real wage data. This is likely due to the fact that the variable used in his study was the cruder binary
indicator variable for absolutist “princes” from DeLong and Shleifer (1993).
8and signiﬁcant, consistent with the interpretation that less population pressure on the land
leads to higher levels of worker productivity and hence higher wages. Overall, given that
the institutional indices are signiﬁcant after controlling for the supply of land and labor,
it is hard to make the case that factor endowments were a more fundamental determinant
of income levels than institutions as Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2002) have posited, albeit
for a diﬀerent historical and geographical context (namely, the colonial settlement of the
Americas).
[Insert Table 1]
Based on these estimates, the predicted impact of an improvement in institutions is
non-trivial. Ceteris paribus, a change in property rights regime from the worst possible
to the best (from 1 to 7) would have implied an increase of 0.046 × 6=0 .276 log units
in the real skilled wage based on the “constraint” coeﬃcient in Column 1. The mean log
real skilled wage for the 59 data points in the sample with a “constraint” value of 1 was
1.77, so this wholesale improvement in institutions would have amounted to a respectable
16% increase on average in the log real wage for such cities.
The rest of Table 1 performs a series of comprehensive robustness checks. Column
2 examines some further forces that might have been driving income levels in Europe
during this period. In particular, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002) have drawn
attention to the importance of access to Atlantic trade for a city’s prospects for growth.
I thus include a dummy variable for Atlantic traders (equal to 1 for cities in England, the
Netherlands, France and Spain). Column 2 also controls for the latitude of the city (as a
proxy for geography or climate), as well as the fraction of years of war. This last variable
was constructed at the country level from Kohn’s (1999) Dictionary of Wars for 40-year
windows (namely 1480-1519 for the 1500 data point etc). However, none of these three
variables appears to be a particularly robust determinant of movements in the skilled
wage. More importantly, these additional controls did not detract from the signiﬁcance
of “constraint” or “protection”.11
11These conclusions do not change if the Atlantic dummy, latitude or the war variable are added
individually to the regression speciﬁcation. The results are also not altered substantively if a shorter
20-year window (1490-1509 for the 1500 data point etc) is used for the coding of the war variable instead.
This statement on robustness also applies to the ﬁndings below for unskilled wages (Table 2) and wage
inequality (Table 3).
9In Column 3, I remove a possible outlier, London, given its status as the industrial
leader of the pack, while also being the only city to obtain a score of 7 on either institu-
tional index. This actually increases the institutions coeﬃcients, both of which are now
signiﬁcant at the 1% level, a result which should allay some of the concern that the insti-
tutions variables may simply be picking up the eﬀects of an underlying industrialization
process. Interestingly, the Atlantic dummy now assumes a large positive and signiﬁcant
role in this speciﬁcation. The results are similarly robust to the removal of Amsterdam
(regression not shown), another major commercial leader within our sample of cities. The
removal of Istanbul also does not alter the results much (regression not shown), so the
ﬁndings are not being skewed by the merging of wage data from separate sources. How-
ever, the results are slightly weaker when the regressions are run unweighted in Column
4. The signiﬁcance levels of “constraint” and “protection” drop oﬀ, although the point
estimates do remain positive.12
C o l u m n5c o n s i d e r sad i ﬀerent way of computing the standard errors by clustering
them by country, instead of within each country-year group. Bertrand, Duﬂoa n dM u l -
lainathan (2004) recommend this procedure as a way of correcting for the downward bias
in standard errors that emerges when both dependent and explanatory variables are se-
rially correlated in a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimation.13 Reassuringly, this correction
only reduces the statistical signiﬁcance of the institutions variables slightly.
The ﬁnal speciﬁcation in Table 1 includes estimates of adult literacy rates from Allen
(2003), in order to test the contention in Glaeser et. al. (2004) that human capital is
a more fundamental determinant of long-run growth than institutions. In this context,
adult literacy was gauged by the ability to sign one’s name, and is clearly a simple proxy
at best for human capital, while being subject to the usual caveats about the reliability of
such historical data. (Estimates were available for all states except the Ottoman Empire.)
12The statistical signiﬁc a n c eo ft h ei n s t i t u t i o n sc o e ﬃcients is similarly diminished when the total pop-
ulation of each country is used as regression weights instead. However, the results involving unskilled
wages (Table 2) and the skilled-unskilled wage ratio (Table 3) are not as sensitive to this alternative choice
of regression weights, with “constraint” and “protection” both remaining signiﬁcant in these cases.
13This critique is most salient in applications with one policy intervention, but where many pre- and
post-intervention data points have been used to estimate a treatment eﬀect. As a further possible ﬁxf o r
this problem, Bertrand et. al. (2004) also recommend averaging the pre- and post-intervention data when
estimating the treatment eﬀect. In this regard, the fact that the wage variables in this paper are 50-year
averages instead of the annual time series underlying Allen (2001) should further lessen any potential
bias in the standard errors.
10Although the regression results in Column 6 suggest a positive (though insigniﬁcant) eﬀect
of higher literacy rates on real skilled wages, this does not detract from the signiﬁcance of
either “constraint” or “protection”. In short, there is insuﬃcient evidence to suggest that
initial human capital mattered more than institutions in determining skilled wages.14
At this juncture, despite the robust correlation uncovered between the security of
private property and real skilled wages, it is useful to caution against interpreting this as
foolproof evidence of a direct causal relationship from institutions to wage outcomes. The
inclusion of city and year ﬁxed eﬀects and a city-speciﬁc linear time trend should help
to control for other variables that might be driving both the institutions and wage data
simultaneously, although this might not be fully adequate if the omitted variables are
underlying processes that follow a more complicated time trend. Also, the use of initial
values for the right-hand-side variables helps to reduce the possibility of reverse causality,
but this is a simple solution at best given the absence of a suitable instrumental variable,
particularly for the measures of institutions.15
Turning now to the data on real unskilled wages, one reaches very similar conclusions
on the positive eﬀect of institutions. In fact, the estimates indicate that property rights
institutions had an even larger impact on unskilled workers than they did for skilled crafts-
men. This is already clear from the larger coeﬃcients on “constraint” and “protection”
in the basic (unweighted) speciﬁcation without the controls, Xijt:
logReal unskilled wages =

   






   
   
+ Dj + Dj × t + Dt +  ijt
H e r e ,* *a n d* * *d e n o t es i g n i ﬁcance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively, where the
standard errors have been clustered within each country-year group.
Expanding the analysis to include more control variables in Table 2, one ﬁnds that
the institutions coeﬃcients tend to increase further; for example, in Column 1, the “con-
straint” coeﬃcient is now 0.085 and that for “protection” is 0.088, slightly less than double
14The institutions measures remain signiﬁcant when the adult literacy variable is added to the speciﬁ-
cation in Column 1, which excludes the Atlantic dummy variable.
15Although settler mortality rates have become a popular instrument for institutions since Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson (2001), this variable cannot be used for our purposes. The available data lists
mortality rates of European settlers in the former colonies and excludes coverage of most of Europe itself,
nor does it extend suﬃciently far back in time to the 1500s where the sample in this paper starts.
11the size of the corresponding estimates for real skilled wages in Table 1. In particular,
an increase from 1 to 7 on the “constraint” index would raise real unskilled wages by
0.085 × 6=0 .510 log points. Since the mean log real unskilled wage for data points
with a “constraint” value of 1 was 1.27, this improvement in the property rights environ-
ment would have boosted log real unskilled wages dramatically by 40% on average for
such cities. Comparing this with the previous estimate for skilled wages, one can already
see the key implication for wage inequality, namely that unskilled laborers gained more
relative to skilled craftsmen from better institutions.
[Insert Table 2]
The results in Table 2 also show that the variables related to population size and land
area generally have the predicted eﬀects on real unskilled wages. Once again, cities with
larger populations experienced higher wage levels; in Columns 1-5, the city population
variable has a positive coeﬃcient when signiﬁcant. Also, a higher relative supply of urban
labor appears to lower unskilled wages, though the coeﬃcient estimates here are not
statistically signiﬁcant. Lastly, a high agricultural land-population ratio tends to raise
the incomes of the unskilled.
As was the case in Table 1, the role of institutions is robust to various modiﬁcations.
Both “constraint” and “protection” beat out the Atlantic dummy, latitude and the frac-
tion of years of war in the regressions in Column 2. The ﬁndings are moreover not driven
by London (Column 3), Amsterdam or Istanbul (regressions not shown). The institutions
coeﬃcients remain signiﬁcant when the regressions are run unweighted (Column 4), unlike
the corresponding regressions for skilled wages in Table 1. Clustering the standard errors
by country also makes little diﬀerence (Column 5). Finally, controlling for adult literacy
in Column 6 does not erase the importance of the institutions variables.
In summary, using either measure of the security of private property, I ﬁnd that states
with stronger institutions experienced higher real wages for both skilled and unskilled
workers. This conclusion is especially strong since it holds after controlling for other
potential determinants of wage levels such as factor supplies, access to Atlantic trade and
even adult literacy.
122.3 Institutions and wage inequality
I turn now to examine the relationship between institutions and inequality, using the
skilled-unskilled wage ratio as a measure of inequality in labor market returns. A basic
(unweighted) regression of the log relative wage on just the institutional variables, city
and year ﬁxed eﬀects, and city time trends reveals a negative partial correlation:
logRelative wage =

   
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+ Dj + Dj × t + Dt +  ijt
Note that the eﬀect of property rights institutions is signiﬁcant at the 5% level, where
the standard errors are once again clustered by country-year groups.
This conclusion is reinforced by Table 3 where other control variables are added. In
Column 1, “constraint” and “protection” both retain a signiﬁcant eﬀect (at the 1% level)
on the log relative wage. I also obtain a negative (though not statistically signiﬁcant)
coeﬃcient on the city to total population ratio, consistent with what theory would predict:
Low values of this variable indicate a relative abundance of rural workers, which would
imply a large pool of surplus unskilled labor that could potentially migrate to the urban
centers. This would tend to depress the wages of the unskilled relative to the skilled,
hence increasing urban inequality. Of some interest, the city population coeﬃcient shows
up with a negative sign when signiﬁcant, suggesting that larger cities were less unequal.
[Insert Table 3]
This strong negative relationship between institutions and inequality survives the full
battery of robustness checks. Controlling for access to Atlantic trade, latitude, and the
fraction of years of war does not alter the eﬀects of “constraint” or “protection” (Column
2). The results are also similar if London (Column 3), Amsterdam or Istanbul (regressions
not shown) are removed. Both institutions coeﬃcients remain signiﬁcant at the 5% level
when the regressions are run unweighted (Column 4), or when the standard errors are
clustered by country (Column 5). The inclusion of adult literacy as a proxy for human
capital does reduce the signiﬁcance levels, but does not change the negative sign of the
institutions coeﬃcients (Column 6). The Atlantic dummy takes on a large positive and
signiﬁcant value in this speciﬁcation, suggesting that one of the cities with access to
13Atlantic trade might be driving this result. Indeed, when this regression is re-run without
Amsterdam, our results are partially restored: Both “constraint” (coeﬃcient = −0.044)
and “protection” (coeﬃcient = −0.048) are now signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Figure 1 oﬀers an illustration of this distinct relationship between institutions and
wage inequality. The vertical axis plots the residuals from the regression in Column 2
of Table 3 but excluding the “constraint” variable, while the horizontal axis plots the
residuals from regressing “constraint” against the same set of covariates (weighted by
the city population). This partial scatter plot reveals the negative correlation between
t h er e l a t i v ew a g ea n di n s t i t u t i o n sa f t e rﬁltering out the eﬀects of population size, land
endowments, access to Atlantic trade and other controls. The regression line in the ﬁgure
has a slope of −0.038 (after weighting by city population), signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
The “STR” observation for 1650 which has the largest positive wage residual at the top
of the ﬁgure may appear like a potential outlier, but the slope of the regression line still
remains negative (value = −0.037) and signiﬁcant if this single point is removed.
[Insert Figure 1]
The potential quantitative impact of a strengthening of institutions on wage inequality
turns out to be large. Using the Column 1 estimates in Table 3, an increase in “constraint”
from a score of 1 to 7 would result in an expected decrease of 0.038×6=0 .228 log points
in the skilled-unskilled wage ratio. Given that the average log relative wage for cities with
a “constraint” value of 1 was 0.51, this would imply an average decline in wage inequality
of 45%. This represents a large compression in the wage distribution, even if it were
gradually spread out over the course of several centuries.
I conclude that stronger property rights institutions were associated with a reduction
in wage inequality, with unskilled workers receiving a larger boost in wage returns than
skilled workers. The robustness of this ﬁnding also provides a partial response to a com-
mon criticism of institutional codings like the Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002)
variables, namely that they rely too much on ex post assessments after income levels have
been observed, and are thus inevitably correlated with whether countries are seen to be
growing well. While this might explain the observed correlation with real wages, it is
unclear why these institutional variables would also necessarily exhibit such a systematic
negative correlation with relative wages. Instead, it would appear that the concept of
14“institutions” does capture some substantive economic forces that have predictable eﬀects
on other aspects of the economy, including the distribution of incomes.
3 Some explanations for the link between institu-
tions and inequality
The observed relationship between stronger security of property rights and lower levels of
inequality clearly merits more discussion. Indeed, existing theoretical models have been
more concerned with the reverse direction of causation, namely how an initial conﬁgu-
ration of the income distribution can aﬀect a society’s choice of policies regarding state
taxation (Alesina and Rodrik 1994) and the extent of property rights protection (Tok-
man 1999). These two models are however not particularly relevent to the context of
pre-modern Europe, given the general absence of voting democracies then. Separately,
Glaeser, Scheinkman and Shleifer (2003) propose a model in which legal institutions are
more liable to be subverted by the rich or politically inﬂuential in countries with higher
initial levels of inequality. Their model however takes a stylized investment game be-
tween individual players as a starting point, from which it is hard to relate the quality of
institutions to labor market outcomes.
Therefore, I focus instead on explanations of how the institutional environment (taken
as exogenous) can aﬀect subsequent wage inequality, consistent with the evidence pre-
sented in this paper. A decline in the skilled-unskilled wage ratio might be due to two
proximate causes, either a decline in the relative demand for or a rise in the relative supply
of skilled labor. In the context of pre-modern Europe, it seems unlikely that the former of
these possibilities was at play: Improvements in property rights institutions would raise
income levels and hence the demand for construction, but that likely would have raised
the wages of skilled craftsmen and unskilled laborers across the board, rather than being
so largely biased in favor of unskilled workers.
The explanations I propose thus center on how having better institutions can actually
improve the incentives for workers to acquire skills, thereby increasing the relative supply
of skilled workers. The working paper version of this paper (Chor 2004) presented a gen-
eral equilibrium model in the spirit of Harris and Todaro (1970) that incorporated such
labor supply shifts within the context of the rural-urban migration that drove the expan-
15sion of Europe’s cities:16 When the protection of property rights improves and wages rise
for both skilled and unskilled workers, it becomes relatively less costly for rural laborers
t om i g r a t ei n t ot h ec i t ya n da t t e m p tt oa c q u i r eas k i l l e dc r a f t .T h i si n d u c e sam o v e m e n t
of workers into urban centers, raising the supply of potential apprentices, and hence of
skilled craftsmen over the course of time. If this labor supply response is suﬃciently
large, skilled wages could rise less relative to unskilled wages in the long-run equilibrium
after labor supplies have adjusted, thus resulting in lower urban wage inequality.17 In
support of this model, I presented evidence in this working paper conﬁrming that cities
with stronger institutions had larger populations relative to their surrounding rural pop-
ulation, suggesting that rural-urban migration did take place in larger volumes into such
cities.18
As an alternative explanation, one can also posit a link between institutions and
prevailing interest rates that could aﬀect the incentives to accumulate human capital
more directly.19 It has been argued that one of the key beneﬁts of the strengthening
of property rights institutions was that it lowered the costs of borrowing by increasing
the likelihood of repayment by debtors, even when the debtor was the state or sovereign.
North and Weingast (1989), for example, have shown that interest rates paid on long-term
government borrowing declined in England after the “Glorious Revolution”. Insofar as
the market interest rate is positively correlated with the opportunity cost of not working
now and investing in skills instead, a drop in this interest rate would increase a given
urban resident’s likelihood of embarking on an apprenticeship to try to acquire a skilled
craft.
16De Vries (1984) and Hohenberg and Lees (1985) provide an in-depth study of the important role
played by rural-urban migration in driving the growth of Europe’s cities.
17If one adopts the view that inequality is detrimental to growth, then improvements in institutions that
reduce inequality could provide an impetus for further increases in income levels. Empirically, however,
there is a lack of consensus on this link between inequality and growth, and hence this paper does not
emphasize this potential feedback eﬀect. For example, Alesina and Rodrik (1994) ﬁnd that inequality
appears to hurt growth, but Forbes (2000) estimates this relationship to be positive instead. Using non-
parametric methods, Banerjee and Duﬂo (2003) argue for a non-linear trend, with both increases and
decreases in inequality associated with lower subsequent growth.
18This evidence is clearly consistent with DeLong and Shleifer’s (1993) ﬁnding that cities under abso-
lutist princes experienced slower population growth.
19I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out this potential channel of impact.
164 Concluding remarks
This paper has examined the relationships between institutions, real wages and wage
inequality, in the context of the long-run growth experience of cities in Europe and its
periphery. I ﬁnd that cities which enforced more stringent property rights protection
had higher real wages for both skilled craftsmen and unskilled laborers, a result which
dovetails with earlier work on the positive impact of institutions on aggregate incomes.
By focusing on wages instead of macro aggregates, I also identify an additional eﬀect:
Cities with stronger institutions witnessed lower levels of wage inequality, as measured by
the skilled-unskilled wage ratio.
The paper suggests two candidate explanations for the observed negative relationship
between institutions and urban wage inequality, both of which work through the predicted
eﬀect of institutions on the supply of skilled relative to unskilled labor. The basic intuition
behind these arguments is fairly general: When the acquisition of skills is costly, an
improvement in institutions can lead to an increase in the supply of skilled labor, since
workers will be more willing to invest in education or training when they are more assured
of reaping the full rewards of their investment in human capital or when prevailing interest
rates are lower.
There is clearly scope for more work to be done to explore the linkages between
institutions, growth and inequality that have been uncovered in this study. It would be
important for example to establish how the advancement of property rights institutions
aﬀected the gap between wage owners and landlords, as captured by wage-rental ratios.
This is a key component of aggregate inequality in pre-modern Europe that the regressions
in this paper have not been able to address, largely because of the limited historical data
on land rents particularly for the European periphery.20 Along these lines, it would also
be interesting to investigate if similar relationships between the quality of institutions and
inequality continue to hold for the more recent, post-World War II period.
20In an earlier version of this paper available upon request, I present some preliminary results using the
available rent series from Clark (2002) for London, and O’Rourke and Williamson (2002) for France and
the Netherlands. Using regression speciﬁcations similar to equation (1), but excluding year ﬁxed eﬀects,
there is suggestive evidence based on wage-rental ratios in this sample of three countries that institutions
helped to improve the position of labor (both skilled and unskilled) relative to landowners. These results
are however not robust to the inclusion of year dummies.
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Data Appendix
Wages: From Allen (2001) for all cities, except Istanbul, which is from ¨ Ozmucur and
Pamuk (2002). The underlying annual series for Allen (2001) can be downloaded
from: http://www.econ.ox.ac.uk/Members/robert.allen/WagesPrices.htm
Total population: From McEvedy and Jones (1978), with geometric interpolation
where necessary. In units of millions of people. Cities are matched to states as
follows: Antwerp (ANT) to Belgium; Amsterdam (AMS) to The Netherlands; Lon-
don (LON) to England; Florence (FLO), Milan (MIL) & Naples (NAP) to Italy;
Valencia (VAL) & Madrid (MAD) to Spain; Paris (PAR) & Strasbourg (STR) to
France; Augsburg (AUG) & Leipzig (LEI) to Germany; Vienna (VIE) to Austria;
Gdansk (GDA), Krakow (KRA) & Warsaw (WAR) to Poland; Istanbul (IST) to the
Ottoman Empire.
City population: From Bairoch, Batou and Ch` evre (1988) for all cities, except Istanbul,
which is from Chandler (1987). In units of millions of people.
Rural population:C o m p u t e d a s ( 1 −Urbanization Rate)×(Total Population), with
geometric interpolation where necessary. Data on urbanization rates are from Ace-
moglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002).
Agricultural land area: Sum of arable and pasture land areas in each country, as listed
in the Food and Agricultural Organization’s (FAO) Production Yearbook,i nt e n so f
millions of hectares. This ﬁgure does not change much across diﬀerent years of the
Production Yearbook, and so a constant value is used for each country, taken from
the earliest possible edition of the Yearbook where data for the country is reported.
Institutions: From Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002). Indices were coded on a
scale of 1 to 7, with larger numbers indicating stronger capitalist institutions. For
the constraint on executive index, the coding followed the criteria established in the
Marshall and Jaggers (2000) Polity IV dataset: Scores range from a 1 where “there
are no regular limitations on the executive’s actions”, to a 7 where “accountability
groups have eﬀective authority equal to or greater than the executive in most ac-
tivity”. The index takes on the Polity IV values for 1800 and 1850, where available.
Earlier and missing values were then coded independently by the authors and a
research assistant for cross-checking purposes. Separately, Acemoglu, Johnson and
Robinson also constructed the protection of capital index. There, the coding criteria
range from a 1 for polities where “merchants have no eﬀective protection against
20arbitrary conﬁscation by the ruler”, to a 7 where “the government is formed by and
largely inﬂuenced or controlled by merchants and middle classes”.
The value of the index in a given year is the average over ﬁve observations centered
on that year, for example, the 1700 data point is the average over 1680, 1690, 1700,
1710 and 1720. Prior to 1700, the index is only coded at century intervals, so for
1550 and 1650, I use the index value from 1500 and 1600 respectively. The interested
reader is directed to Sections 4.1 and 8.3 of Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002)
for more details on the coding of these measures of institutions.
Dummy for Atlantic trade: Equals 1 for cities in England, the Netherlands, France,
and Spain. Equals 0 otherwise.
Latitude:F r o mt h eAtlas of the World, Oxford University Press.
Fraction of Years of War: Based on Kohn (1999). Fraction of years in a given 40-year
window (1480-1519 for the 1500 data point etc) during which a given country was
a tw a ro rh a das i g n i ﬁcant domestic rebellion.
Adult literacy: From Allen (2003). Estimates are of the proportion of the adult pop-
ulation that could sign their own name in each country, and are available for 1500,
1600, 1700, 1750 and 1800. Missing years were imputed by geometric interpolation.
Data is available for all states except the Ottoman Empire.
21Table 1
Institutions and the Real Wages of Skilled Building Craftsmen
Dependent variable = ln(Real Skilled Wage)
Weighted Weighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted Weighted
Excl London Cluster by country
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Institutions variable 0.046** ; 0.050** 0.048** ; 0.055*** 0.074*** ; 0.069*** 0.016 ; 0.043 0.048* ; 0.055* 0.072*** ; 0.078***
(“Constraint” ; “Protection”) (0.021) ; (0.021) (0.019) ; (0.018) (0.022) ; (0.022) (0.024) ; (0.027) (0.025) ; (0.025) (0.027) ; (0.025)
City population 0.15* ; 0.15** 0.14* ; 0.15** −0.44 ; −0.24 0.04 ; 0.07 0.14* ; 0.15** −0.29; −0.04
(0.08) ; (0.07) (0.07) ; (0.07) (0.35) ; (0.34) (0.11) ; (0.11) (0.07) ; (0.06) (0.39) ; (0.41)
City pop. / Total pop. −2.31 ; −2.20 −1.85 ; −1.73 1.80 ; 0.98 −0.72 ; −0.79 −1.85 ; −1.73 −6.80* ; −7.06*
(2.03) ; (2.04) (1.91) ; (1.90) (2.72) ; (2.81) (2.43) ; (2.36) (2.89) ; (2.96) (3.94) ; (3.75)
Agri. land / Total pop. 2.68*** ; 2.76*** 2.87*** ; 2.99*** 3.25*** ; 3.47*** 0.93 ; 1.16 2.87* ; 2.99* 0.60 ; 0.73
(0.91) ; (0.92) (0.88) ; (0.88) (0.86) ; (0.92) (0.81) ; (0.81) (1.46) ; (1.46) (0.87) ; (0.86)
Dummy for Atlantic trader – 0.23 ; 0.16 11.28*** ; 10.18*** 0.11 ; 0.35 0.23 ; 0.16 1.89 ; 1.98
(1.64) ; (1.64) (2.15) ; (2.11) (2.28) ; (2.21) (0.82) ; (0.81) (2.03) ; (1.96)
Latitude – 0.17 ; 0.18 0.45** ; 0.47** −0.21 ; −0.19 0.17 ; 0.18 −0.18 ; −0.18
(0.16) ; (0.16) (0.17) ; (0.19) (0.16) ; (0.16) (0.14) ; (0.14) (0.27) ; (0.26)
Fraction of years of war – 0.133 ; 0.144* 0.146* ; 0.161** 0.083 ; 0.078 0.133 ; 0.144 −0.030 ; −0.014
(0.082) ; (0.084) (0.075) ; (0.079) (0.091) ; (0.089) (0.090) ; (0.097) (0.087) ; (0.087)
Adult literacy rate – – – – – 0.42 ; 0.40
(0.47) ; (0.44)
R
2 0.96 ; 0.96 0.96 ; 0.96 0.92 ; 0.92 0.86 ; 0.87 0.96 ; 0.96 0.92 ; 0.93
Number of observations 118 118 110 118 118 99
Notes: For each column, the ﬁrst set of coeﬃcients is from the regression that uses the constraint on executive index, while the second set reports results using the protection of capital index.
Robust standard errors are reported, clustered within each country-year group (except in Column 5, which is clustered by country only). ***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels respectively. All regressions include city and year ﬁxed eﬀects, as well as city-speciﬁc linear time trends (city dummies interacted with year of observation). Weighted regressions use
the city population in each year as regression weights.
22Table 2
Institutions and the Real Wages of Unskilled Building Laborers
Dependent variable = ln(Real Unskilled Wage)
Weighted Weighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted Weighted
Excl London Cluster by country
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Institutions variable 0.085*** ; 0.088*** 0.087*** ; 0.093*** 0.116*** ; 0.108*** 0.063** ; 0.090*** 0.087** ; 0.093** 0.098*** ; 0.104***
(“Constraint” ; “Protection”) (0.023) ; (0.025) (0.022) ; (0.022) (0.025) ; (0.026) (0.027) ; (0.029) (0.032) ; (0.030) (0.031) ; (0.029)
City population 0.23** ; 0.23** 0.23** ; 0.23** −0.43 ; −0.11 0.06 ; 0.11 0.23** ; 0.23** −0.58 ; −0.25
(0.10) ; (0.10) (0.10) ; (0.09) (0.41) ; (0.40) (0.11) ; (0.11) (0.10) ; (0.08) (0.52) ; (0.55)
City pop. / Total pop. −1.86 ; −1.62 −1.42 ; −1.15 2.60 ; 1.29 0.91 ; 0.75 −1.42 ; −1.15 −6.36 ; −6.71*
(2.26) ; (2.30) (2.08) ; (2.10) (3.13) ; (3.31) (2.32) ; (2.27) (3.29) ; (3.40) (4.14) ; (3.91)
Agri. land / Total pop. 2.66** ; 2.79** 2.84** ; 3.02** 3.30*** ; 3.63*** 0.89 ; 1.24 2.84 ; 3.02 0.02 ; 0.19
(1.16) ; (1.20) (1.18) ; (1.21) (1.18) ; (1.30) (0.72) ; (0.77) (2.01) ; (2.06) (1.07) ; (1.09)
Dummy for Atlantic trader – 0.63 ; 0.57 10.58*** ; 8.81*** 1.29 ; 1.28 0.63 ; 0.57 −3.64 ; −3.52
(1.72) ; (1.73) (3.01) ; (2.91) (1.69) ; (1.74) (1.01) ; (0.97) (2.90) ; (2.86)
Latitude – 0.01 ; 0.03 0.49** ; 0.52** −0.15 ; −0.12 0.01 ; 0.03 −0.17 ; −0.16
(0.19) ; (0.19) (0.20) ; (0.22) (0.16) ; (0.16) (0.17) ; (0.18) (0.34) ; (0.33)
Fraction of years of war – 0.125 ; 0.143 0.145 ; 0.168 0.067 ; 0.075 0.125 ; 0.143 −0.044 ; −0.023
(0.102) ; (0.106) (0.096) ; (0.102) (0.078) ; (0.078) (0.080) ; (0.089) (0.104) ; (0.103)
Adult literacy rate – – – – – 0.49 ; 0.47
(0.73) ; (0.68)
R
2 0.95 ; 0.95 0.95 ; 0.95 0.90 ; 0.90 0.85 ; 0.86 0.95 ; 0.95 0.91 ; 0.92
Number of observations 118 118 110 118 118 99
Notes: See notes for Table 1.
23Table 3
Institutions and Wage Inequality
Dependent variable = ln(Real Skilled Wage / Real Unskilled Wage)
Weighted Weighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted Weighted
Excl London Cluster by country
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Institutions variable −0.038*** ; −0.038*** −0.038*** ; −0.038*** −0.042*** ; −0.038*** −0.047** ; −0.047** −0.038** ; −0.038** −0.025 ; −0.027
(“Constraint” ; “Protection”) (0.010) ; (0.010) (0.009) ; (0.010) (0.012) ; (0.011) (0.019) ; (0.020) (0.014) ; (0.015) (0.018) ; (0.017)
City population −0.09** ; −0.08** −0.09** ; −0.08** −0.01 ; −0.13 −0.03 ; −0.04 −0.09* ; −0.08* 0.29 ; 0.20
(0.04) ; (0.04) (0.04) ; (0.04) (0.15) ; (0.14) (0.07) ; (0.07) (0.04) ; (0.04) (0.32) ; (0.34)
City pop. / Total pop. −0.45 ; −0.58 −0.43 ; −0.58 −0.80 ; −0.31 −1.63 ; −1.54 −0.43 ; −0.58 −0.44 ; −0.35
(0.78) ; (0.81) (0.79) ; (0.81) (1.23) ; (1.23) (1.15) ; (1.18) (0.90) ; (1.00) (2.15) ; (2.16)
Agri. land / Total pop. 0.02 ; −0.03 0.03 ; −0.03 −0.05 ; −0.16 0.05 ; −0.08 0.03 ; −0.03 0.58 ; 0.53
(0.55) ; (0.56) (0.57) ; (0.58) (0.67) ; (0.70) (0.52) ; (0.58) (0.71) ; (0.75) (0.77) ; (0.78)
Dummy for Atlantic trader – −0.40 ; −0.41 0.70 ; 1.37 −1.19 ; −0.93 −0.40 ; −0.41 5.53** ; 5.50**
(0.97) ; (0.97) (1.61) ; (1.56) (1.86) ; (1.82) (0.49) ; (0.50) (2.30) ; (2.30)
Latitude – 0.17* ; 0.15 −0.04 ; −0.05 −0.06 ; −0.07 0.17* ; 0.15* −0.02 ; −0.02
(0.10) ; (0.10) (0.16) ; (0.11) (0.16) ; (0.16) (0.07) ; (0.08) (0.26) ; (0.25)
Fraction of years of war – 0.008 ; 0.001 0.001 ; −0.008 0.015 ; 0.003 0.008 ; 0.001 0.014 ; 0.009
(0.042) ; (0.043) (0.045) ; (0.046) (0.041) ; (0.040) (0.029) ; (0.025) (0.053) ; (0.053)
Adult literacy rate ––– – – −0.08 ; −0.07
(0.47) ; (0.45)
R
2 0.78 ; 0.77 0.78 ; 0.77 0.76 ; 0.76 0.61 ; 0.60 0.78 ; 0.77 0.74 ; 0.74
Number of observations 118 118 110 118 118 99
Notes: See notes for Table 1.
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Notes:  Slope of regression line is -0.038, significant at the 1% level, using city population as regression 
weights, and clustering the standard errors within each country-year group. The residual values plotted are 
from a regression of the log skilled-unskilled wage ratio or the constraint index respectively on: city 
population, the ratio of city to total population, the ratio of agricultural land area to total population, the 
Atlantic dummy, latitude, fraction of years of war, city fixed effects, year fixed effects, and city-specific 
linear time trends, weighted by city population.  
 
 